Inbal Talgam-Cohen

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Tim RoughgardenColumbia UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na cs.columbia.edu
Michal FeldmanProfessor of Computer Science, Tel Aviv UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na post.tau.ac.il
Paul David DüttingResearch Scientist at GooglePreverjeni e-poštni naslov na google.com
Yakov BabichenkoTechnionPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na tx.technion.ac.il
Moshe BabaioffHebrew University of JerusalemPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na mail.huji.ac.il
S. Matthew WeinbergAssociate Professor, Princeton UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na princeton.edu
Alon EdenThe Hebrew University of JerusalemPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na mail.huji.ac.il
Noam NisanProfessor of Computer Science, Hebrew University of JerusalemPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na cs.huji.ac.il
Tal AlonPhD student at the Technion – Israel Institute of TechnologyPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na campus.technion.ac.il
Ophir FriedlerPh.D at Tel Aviv UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na mail.tau.ac.il
Hu FuUniversity of British ColumbiaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na cs.ubc.ca
Haifeng XuUniversity of ChicagoPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na uchicago.edu
Nir RosenfeldTechnionPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na cs.technion.ac.il
Anupam GuptaProfessor of Computer Science at New York UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na nyu.edu
Qiqi YanGoogle IncPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na qiqiyan.com
Uriel FeigeProfessor of Computer Science, Weizmann Institute of SciencePreverjeni e-poštni naslov na weizmann.ac.il
Ganesh GhalmeAssistant Professor, Department of AI, IIT HyderabadPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na csa.iisc.ernet.in
Vineet NairArithmic LabsPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na arithmic.com
Mohammad MahdianResearch Scientist, GooglePreverjeni e-poštni naslov na alum.mit.edu
Patrick R JordanPartner Scientist, MicrosoftPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na umich.edu

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Inbal Talgam-Cohen

Faculty member at the School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University

Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na tauex.tau.ac.il - Domača stran

Algorithms Incentives Contract Design


Naslov Razvrsti po navedbah Razvrsti po letniku Razvrsti po naslovu	Navedeno Navedeno	Leto
Simple versus optimal contracts P Dütting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 369-387, 2019	103	2019
Optimal and robust mechanism design with interdependent values T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 4 (3), 1-34, 2016	87*	2016
Vertex sparsifiers: New results from old techniques M Englert, A Gupta, R Krauthgamer, H Racke, I Talgam-Cohen, K Talwar SIAM Journal on Computing 43 (4), 1239-1262, 2014	84	2014
Modularity and greed in double auctions P Dütting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation …, 2014	72	2014
Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen Mathematics of Operations Research 46 (1), 382-403, 2021	67*	2021
The complexity of contracts P Dutting, T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen SIAM Journal on Computing 50 (1), 211-254, 2021	61	2021
Supply-limiting mechanisms T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 844-861, 2012	54	2012
Strategic classification in the dark G Ghalme, V Nair, I Eilat, I Talgam-Cohen, N Rosenfeld International Conference on Machine Learning, 3672-3681, 2021	53	2021
Ad auctions with data H Fu, P Jordan, M Mahdian, U Nadav, I Talgam-Cohen, S Vassilvitskii International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 168-179, 2012	51	2012
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with complements A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg Operations Research 69 (1), 188-206, 2021	48*	2021
Multiagent evaluation mechanisms T Alon, M Dobson, A Procaccia, I Talgam-Cohen, J Tucker-Foltz Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34 (02), 1774-1781, 2020	46	2020
The competition complexity of auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer result for multi-dimensional bidders A Eden, M Feldman, O Friedler, I Talgam-Cohen, SM Weinberg EC'17, 2017	46	2017
Approximately optimal mechanism design T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen Annual Review of Economics 11 (1), 355-381, 2019	41	2019
Regret-minimizing Bayesian persuasion Y Babichenko, I Talgam-Cohen, H Xu, K Zabarnyi Games and Economic Behavior 136, 226-248, 2022	39	2022
Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes. M Babaioff, N Nisan, I Talgam-Cohen ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 19, 180, 2019	39	2019
Contracts with private cost per unit-of-effort T Alon, P Dütting, I Talgam-Cohen Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 52-69, 2021	38	2021
Why prices need algorithms T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen Proceedings of the sixteenth acm conference on economics and computation, 19-36, 2015	34	2015
Bayesian analysis of linear contracts T Alon, P Dütting, Y Li, I Talgam-Cohen EC'23, 2023	22	2023
Robust auctions for revenue via enhanced competition T Roughgarden, I Talgam-Cohen, Q Yan Operations Research 68 (4), 1074-1094, 2020	21	2020
Unified fair allocation of goods and chores via copies Y Gafni, X Huang, R Lavi, I Talgam-Cohen ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 11 (3-4), 1-27, 2023	19	2023

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