Bettina Klaus

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Flip KlijnScientific Researcher & Director (IAE-CSIC) and Research Professor (Barcelona School of Economics)Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na iae.csic.es
Lars EhlersProfessor of Economics, Universite de MontrealPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na umontreal.ca
Markus WalzlInnsbruck UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na uibk.ac.at
Olivier BochetProfessor of Economics, New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD)Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na nyu.edu
Raymond J. SupallaProfessor of Agricultural Economics, University of NebraskaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na unl.edu
David ManloveProfessor of Algorithms and Complexity, School of Computing Science, University of GlasgowPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na glasgow.ac.uk
Murat AtlamazDigonex Inc.Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na digonex.com
Mehmet KarakayaDepartment of Economics, İzmir Katip Çelebi University, İzmir, TurkeyPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na ikcu.edu.tr
Itai AshlagiStanford UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na stanford.edu
Emin KaragözoğluBilkent University, Department of EconomicsPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na bilkent.edu.tr
Szilvia PápaiAssociate Professor of Economics, Concordia UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na concordia.ca
Jonathan NewtonKyoto University Institute of Economic ResearchPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Jordi MassóProfessor of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na uab.es
Di FengSimons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (Mathematical Sciences Research Institute)Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na msri.org
Haris AzizUNSW Sydney - Scientia Associate ProfessorPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na unsw.edu.au
Battal DoğanUniversity of Bristol, School of EconomicsPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na bristol.ac.uk
Jan Christoph SchlegelUniversity of LondonPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na city.ac.uk
Christian BasteckWZB Berlin Social Science CenterPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na wzb.eu
Dorothea KüblerWZB Social Science Center Berlin and TU BerlinPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na wzb.eu
Burak CanMaastricht UniversityPreverjeni e-poštni naslov na maastrichtuniversity.nl

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Bettina Klaus

Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC), University of Lausanne

Preverjeni e-poštni naslov na unil.ch - Domača stran

Game Theory Market Design Social Choice Theory


Naslov Razvrsti po navedbah Razvrsti po letniku Razvrsti po naslovu	Navedeno Navedeno	Leto
Stable matchings and preferences of couples B Klaus, F Klijn Journal of Economic Theory 121 (1), 75-106, 2005	184	2005
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems L Ehlers, B Klaus Social Choice and Welfare 21 (2), 265-280, 2003	147	2003
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts B Klaus, M Walzl Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (7-8), 422-434, 2009	126	2009
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples B Klaus, F Klijn Games and Economic Behavior 58 (1), 154-171, 2007	98	2007
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems B Klaus, E Miyagawa International Journal of Game Theory 30, 421-435, 2002	86	2002
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems L Ehlers, B Klaus International Journal of Game Theory 32, 545-560, 2004	78	2004
Procedurally fair and stable matching B Klaus, F Klijn Economic Theory 27, 431-447, 2006	75	2006
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems L Ehlers, B Klaus, S Pápai Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (3), 329-339, 2002	73	2002
Consistent house allocation L Ehlers, B Klaus Economic Theory 30, 561-574, 2007	68	2007
Median stable matching for college admissions B Klaus, F Klijn International Journal of Game Theory 34, 1-11, 2006	68	2006
Stochastic stability for roommate markets B Klaus, F Klijn, M Walzl Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6), 2218-2240, 2010	67	2010
Efficient priority rules L Ehlers, B Klaus Games and Economic Behavior 55 (2), 372-384, 2006	59	2006
Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians B Klaus, F Klijn Social Choice and Welfare 35 (4), 647-667, 2010	54	2010
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) B Klaus, F Klijn, J Massó Review of Economic Design 11, 175-184, 2007	53	2007
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments B Klaus, H Peters, T Storcken Social Choice and Welfare 15, 297-311, 1998	53	1998
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped B Klaus, H Peters, T Storcken Economics Letters 55 (3), 339-346, 1997	46	1997
Matching under preferences B Klaus, DF Manlove, F Rossi Cambridge University Press, 2016	44	2016
A GAME THEORY APPROACH TO DECIDING WHO WILL SUPPLY INSTREAM FLOW WATER¹ R Supalla, B Klaus, O Yeboah, R Bruins JAWRA Journal of the American Water Resources Association 38 (4), 959-966, 2002	42	2002
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics L Ehlers, B Klaus Games and Economic Behavior 97, 128-146, 2016	41	2016
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good B Klaus, H Peters, T Storcken Economic Theory 10, 305-333, 1997	39	1997

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